Loan Sales and Relationship Banking by Parlour, Christine & Plantin, Guillaume
Loan Sales and Relationship Banking∗
Christine A. Parlour† Guillaume Plantin ‡
May 23, 2007
ABSTRACT
Firms raise money from banks and the bond market. Banks may sell loans in a
secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information. Liquidity
in the secondary loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for
trade and affects firms’ optimal financial structure. The endogenous degree of liquidity
is not always socially optimal: there is excessive trading in highly rated names, and
insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds. The model provides testable implications for
prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets, and in bond markets.
Further, we posit that risk-based capital requirements may be socially desirable.
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The term “Collateralized Loan Obligation” (CLOs) was coined in 1989, when corporate
loans were first used as collateral in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).1 Since then,
the growth in loan sales has been enormous. According to Lucas et al. (2006), $1.1 trillion
of CDOs were outstanding as of 2005, and 50% of their collateral was comprised of loans. In
addition to pooled securities, banks also trade first loss positions on single names through
direct sales of individual loans. In the US, loan sales have grown from $8 billion in 1991 to
$154.8 billion by 2004.2 If a bank securitizes or sells a loan that it originated, it is buying
insurance on credit events over which it has either more control or more information than
the buyer.
In the face of this informational friction, why did the secondary market for corporate
loans develop in the 1990’s? What effect has this had on relationship banking? In this
paper, we characterize when a liquid secondary market for loans arises, when a liquid
secondary loan market is socially desirable, and provide testable predictions on the effect of
the emergence of this market on prices and quantities in bond and primary loan markets.
Our predictions are based on both changes in the parameters that lead to higher loan
liquidity and changes in the contracts that are written between banks and firms given this
higher liquidity.
Two views on the rise of active credit risk management by banks have been proposed.
First, more liquid bank assets make asset-liability management easier. Banks can quickly
redeploy capital to more profitable business opportunities, and are more resilient to neg-
ative shocks, as in Greenspan, 2004, and Schuermann, 2004. Following this view, active
secondary loan markets are socially beneficial. Second, and more perniciously, banks can
now unbundle balance sheet management from borrower relationship management. This
may reduce banks’ incentives to monitor and foster a relationship with the borrower, and
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ultimately create a shift from relationship banking to transaction-oriented banking (a view
espoused by Effenberger, 2003; Kiff and Morrow, 2000 and Rule, 2001 among others). If
relationship banking adds value, then loan liquidity may be harmful. We demonstrate that
with endogenous loan liquidity, either of these cases can obtain.
In our stylized model, a firm has a risky, positive NPV long term project that can be
financed with the firm’s own equity or from two outside sources: a bank and the bond
market. The optimal financing mix maximizes the firm’s return on equity subject to the
resolution of a moral hazard problem: the firm may shirk which reduces the project’s
success probability. A bank adds value because it can reduce a firm’s incentive to shirk.
However, through monitoring, banks gain private information about the project’s success.
After monitoring, a bank may receive an attractive outside investment opportunity and
wish to redeploy its funds. An active secondary market gives the bank the flexibility to
recycle capital. However, a liquid market may also reduce a bank’s incentive to monitor
as it could also sell non–performing loans. The impact of an active secondary loan market
on banks and firms depends on this tradeoff between a lower monitoring incentive and the
increased flexibility offered by this market.
In our model, banks differ from the bond market in three ways. First, banks are better
able to monitor the firm than the bond market. This could be because bondholders are
typically dispersed and thus individually have a smaller incentive to monitor. Second, while
monitoring, the bank learns about the success or failure of the project. Thus, in our model
monitoring both resolves a moral hazard problem and generates proprietary information for
the bank. Many of our results are driven by these joint assumptions. Finally, we posit that
banks have a preference for liquid assets.
The assumption that lending generates proprietary information about the borrower is
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common in the banking literature (Rajan, 1992), and well-documented empirically (e.g.,
Lummer and McConnell, 1989). In our setting however, the acquisition of material infor-
mation is an ineluctable but adverse consequence of monitoring.3 Thus, there is a tension
between monitoring and the tradeability of the bank’s risks, which in turn makes moni-
toring costly if the bank values flexibility. This assumption captures the intuition that an
important part of the information that a bank acquires in order to monitor the firm also
helps to predict the firm’s future performance, and cannot be credibly communicated to
outsiders. Examples of such information include the assessment of the top management’s
character, or an understanding of the allocation of real authority within the firm. This type
of information is essentially soft, and acquired by the loan officer through ongoing personal
interaction with the top management. Other examples of information that is necessary for
monitoring purposes but cannot be made publicly available include the trade secrets that
generate a project’s value and whose disclosure would erode competitive advantage.
Liquidity is valuable in our model because a loan on its balance sheet may prevent a
bank from exploiting private redeployment opportunities; either due to insufficient liquidity,
or because of binding capital adequacy requirements. The secondary loan market is only
liquid if adverse selection risk is sufficiently low. A bank that has monitored a firm knows
if the project will succeed or fail. Thus, investors do not know if the bank is shedding
risk because of outside investment opportunities, or because of inside information. If the
adverse selection problem is too severe, trading in the secondary market breaks down as
in Akerlof (1970) and all loans are illiquid. However, if the probability that the bank is
selling its loan for private motives is sufficiently high then there is pooling and the market
is liquid. Possible inside trading by banks in the secondary credit market is reported in the
popular press as a concern among practitioners.4 Altman et al. (2004) find that returns in
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the secondary market for loans lead bond and stock returns around important credit events.
Although the rise of an active loan market is socially efficient ex post, it may not be
socially desirable ex ante. A liquid market has two opposite effects on the cost of bank debt.
First, interest rates on loans are smaller because the bank no longer charges a liquidity
premium. However, the incentive compatible stake of the bank in the project increases,
because the ability to benefit from inside trading reduces the bank’s incentives to monitor
ex ante. In sum, firms must borrow more from banks, albeit at a lower price, if there is a
liquid loan market.
Our model has a number of testable implications. We first observe that the credit spread
in the secondary loan market is not the unconditional probability that the reference entity
will default, rather it is the probability of default conditional on a bank’s willingness to sell.
The unconditional and conditional probabilities differ systematically with a firm’s default
probability, thereby generating an observed liquidity premium in the secondary market.
The rest of our testable implications relate prices and quantities in bond and primary
loan markets after a secondary loan market has arisen. We posit that the secondary market
arose because of regulatory changes in the early 1990’s. First, we predict that secondary
trading volume should be larger for high grade names. Second, a larger trading volume
implies that bank loans and privately placed debt crowd out public bonds in firms’ total
debt issuances. Third, a liquid loan market is efficient, namely increases firms’ total debt
capacity, only if the firm is not too highly rated. Fourth, as the secondary market arises
due to a real shock to bank capital, all bank loans are affected, and the prices become more
sensitive to credit risk for all ratings.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and Pennacchi (1988) study incentive-compatible loan
sales contracts that provide the bank with incentives to keep monitoring the borrower after
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having sold the loan. Loan liquidity is always desirable and second-best efficient in their
setups. This paper focuses instead on the impact of such ex post efficient sales on the
incentives of the bank to monitor the borrower ex ante. We show that liquidity may rise in
the secondary loan market even though this is ex ante inefficient.
Our basic model of moral hazard is adapted from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Our
work is also related to that of Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998). We defer a
discussion of these papers to Section V. In non-banking contexts, Aghion, Bolton, and Ti-
role (2004), and Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2003) develop models in which an impatient
agent markets claims to her future output. The informational efficiency of the market is an
important incentive device for the agent. By contrast in our model, liquidity makes incen-
tives more difficult to enforce because in a liquid market, the bank trades with uninformed
agents.
I. Model
In an economy with three dates, t = 0, 1, and 2, there are three classes of agents: a
firm, a bank, and a large pool of competitive investors. All agents are risk neutral and are
protected by limited liability.5 Neither the investors nor the firm discount future cash flows.
The firm owns the rights to a two period constant returns to scale project. Every dollar
invested in the project at t = 0 has a random date 2 payoff of R with probability p or 0
with probability 1 − p. The firm also has initial equity or net assets, A. In addition to
investing its own assets in the project, the firm can solicit additional funds from the bank
and the outside investors. To do so, the firm offers each group a contract at t = 0. The
firm’s objective is to maximize expected return on equity.
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This simple specification allows us to abstract from security design issues in order to
focus on prices and volumes in bond and loan markets. A large literature has explained the
benefits from pooling risks in security issuances plagued by informational asymmetry.6 We
discuss the implications of a more general stochastic structure in Section V.
Some actions taken by the firm are not observable to outside investors. In particular,
after raising outside funds, the firm may “shirk” and derive a private benefit BF per dollar
invested at t = 1. In this case, the project fails and pays off 0 at date 2. This moral hazard
problem means that financial structure matters.
Active monitoring at t = 0 by the bank reduces the firm’s private benefit per unit
of investment from shirking to bF < BF . Monitoring is costly for the bank as it loses a
private benefit BB per dollar of the project associated with not monitoring.7 An additional
consequence of monitoring is that, through its relationship with the firm, the bank acquires
private information about the project. For simplicity, we assume that private information
is perfect: if the bank monitors, it learns the project’s outcome at date 1.
Our main departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) is the assumption that the bank
maximizes a utility function with a stochastic discount factor. At t = 0, the utility of a
bank is
UB(c0, c˜1, c˜2) = E(c0 + δ1c˜1 + δ1δ˜2c˜2),
where δ1 ∈ (0, 1), and δ˜2 is a two point random variable whose realization at date 1 is
δ˜2 =
 δ ∈ (0, 1) with probability q1 with probability 1− q.
The bank’s realization of δ˜2 at date 1 is private information.8
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The stochastic discount factor δ˜2 proxies for unanticipated changes in the opportunity
cost of carrying outstanding loans. More precisely, it captures the idea that the bank receives
new private opportunities to invest with other borrowers or non lending business, but may
be unable to seize them if it has insufficient liquid assets, or binding capital adequacy ratios.
We discuss the interpretation of δ in more detail below.
After the bank has received her discount factor shock and learned the realization of the
project, we assume that she can offer new contracts to the investors.9 The time line is
presented in Figure 1.
<<Figure 1 About here >>
The assumption that the bank only monitors during the first period is for simplicity.
An additional moral hazard problem during period 2 would complicate the analysis without
offering any further insights. We note in passing that this first period need not be long.
“Monitoring” may mean, for example, restricting the initial choice of assets made by the
firm. Thus, our model could apply to situations in which the bank sheds risk shortly after
having originated the loan.
To interpret the stochastic discount factor, suppose that the bank receives a private
investment opportunity with an expected rate of return of µ, but does not hold enough liquid
assets to undertake the new investment. In this case, the opportunity cost of carrying an
outstanding claim to a date 2 unit payment, instead of selling it and investing the proceeds
in the redeployment opportunity implies a discount of
δ =
1
1 + µ
.
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In addition to liquidity risk, binding capital adequacy ratios are also often mentioned
as a motive for loan sales (Saunders and Cornett, 2006). Assume that the bank has a
binding solvency ratio at date 1. Suppose that the capital requirement associated with a
claim is κ%.10 Then, selling this claim frees up κ cents of regulatory capital at date 1. The
opportunity cost of retaining the loan is therefore
δ =
1
1 + µκ′κ
,
where κ′% is the capital requirement that applies to the redeployment opportunity.
We restrict the analysis to renegotiation-proof contracts. This distinguishes our paper
from Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004), who assume full commitment in a related frame-
work. We assume that all random variables are independent. To ensure interior solutions
we impose additional parameter restrictions when we solve for the optimal contracts.
II. Characterization of the Optimal Contracts
We characterize the optimal renegotiation proof contracts offered by the firm at t = 0 to
the different creditors, and restrict the analysis to situations in which the firm needs bank
financing.Before we characterize the optimal contracts that a firm offers to the bank and
outside investors at time 0, we study the loan sale negotiated by the bank at time 1.
A. Spreads in the Secondary Loan Market
At t = 1, there are possible gains from trade between a bank with a high opportunity cost
of carrying the loan and outside investors. The bank may sell its claim on date 2 cash flows
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at date 1. At this time the bank has two pieces of private information: The opportunity
cost of the loan, δ˜2, and it knows if the firm’s project has succeeded or failed. Recall, that
a failed project pays off 0. Thus, a bank with a claim to a failed project will sell future
cash flows at any positive price. Observe that limited liability precludes signalling in this
market. A bank holding a defaulted loan is willing to mimic any contract that does not
involve negative payments.11
If the only motive for trade in the secondary market is to dispose of failed projects, then
the price must be zero.12 We term such a market illiquid. Alternatively, the price could
be such that a bank with a liquidity shock would also be willing to sell the loan. We deem
such a market to be liquid.
Definition 1 The secondary loan market is liquid if a bank with a preference shock (δ˜2 = δ)
is willing to sell both failed and successful claims. A secondary market is illiquid if such a
bank is only willing to sell failed claims.
If the market is liquid, then investors believe that the bank is selling either because the
project failed (which occurs with probability 1 − p) or that the project succeeded but the
bank received an attractive outside opportunity. This occurs with probability pq. Thus, if
the market is liquid, outside investors value one promised date 2 dollar at a price r where
r =
pq
1− p+ pq .
Notice that r < p, the unconditional probability that the project succeeds. The loan spread
in the secondary market incorporates an adverse selection discount. The spread is not
given by the unconditional default probability (1−p); rather, it reflects the probability that
the firm defaults conditional upon the fact that the bank is willing to sell the risk. This
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is always weakly higher than the unconditional default probability. Figure 2 depicts the
default probability and the spread in the secondary market.
<< Figure 2 about here >>
Let ∆(p) denote the difference between the promised spread in the secondary market
and the unconditional default probability.
∆(p) = (1− r)− (1− p)
=
(1− p) p(1− q)
1− p+ pq
≥ 0
Thus, ∆(p) is the “liquidity premium,” or that part of the promised loan spread that is
not explained by prior default probabilities.
Lemma 1 If the loan market is active, then
(i) The liquidity premium, ∆(p) is concave in p, the unconditional probability of no-default.
(ii) The ratio of the liquidity premium to the unconditional default probability, ∆(p)1−p is in-
creasing in the credit rating p.
In other words, an econometrician comparing historical defaults (1 − p) and spreads
in the secondary loan market (1 − r), would find a “liquidity premium” ∆(p) unexplained
by historical defaults. She would also find that this premium is a higher fraction of the
total spread for higher credit ratings. This qualitative feature is broadly consistent with
the empirical findings of Berndt et al. (2005) in another secondary credit market, the credit
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default swap market. Intuitively, the liquidity spread is an adverse selection discount that
depends on the bank’s informational advantage. The size of this depends on the variance
of the prior (p(1 − p)). By contrast, the unconditional spread depends only on its mean.
The expected credit losses decrease faster than their variance as p increases.
B. Characterization of Optimal Contracts
The contracts offered by the firm at date 0 differ if participants anticipate a liquid loan
market. To characterize the optimal contracts, we consider two cases depending on whether
an active secondary loan market can exist. Recall the firm has assets A, and owns a
project which generates a return per unit of investment of R with probability p and 0 with
probability 1 − p. For a given investment size, I, the firm pledges a portion of the final
payoff to the bank, RBI to secure a loan of size L, and another portion RMI to the market
to secure a bond issue of size M . The firm retains a portion RF I and maximizes expected
profits piF = pRF I −A by choosing {I, L,M,RF , RB}.
If there is no active secondary loan market, the firm chooses a contract:
MaxI,L,M,RF ,RB {pRF I −A}
s.t.
pRF ≥ bF (1)
δ1Eδ2pRB ≥ BB (2)
δ1Eδ2pRBI ≥ L (3)
p (R−RF −RB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RM
I ≥ M (4)
I ≤ M +A+ L (5)
I, L,M,RF , RB ≥ 0 (6)
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Conditions (1) and (2) are the incentive compatibility constraints of the firm and the bank,
respectively. Equation (1) ensures that the firm, if monitored, will not shirk. If the firm
does not shirk, then it receives a payoff of pRF I, whereas if it shirks and is monitored by the
bank, the payoff is bF I. Condition (2) ensures that the bank’s payoff is higher if it monitors
the firm than if it does not. Specifically, if the bank does not monitor, it consumes private
benefits proportional to the size of the project: BBI. If the bank does monitor the firm,
then it receives a promised payoff of RBI with probability p. The time t = 1 value of this
expected payout depends on the realization of the bank’s discount factor between t = 1 and
t = 2: The date 0 expected value of the discount factor is Eδ2. Further, the bank discounts
any cash flows between t = 1 and t = 0 at δ1. Conditions (3) and (4) are the participation
constraints of the bank and the outside investors. Condition (5) is a resource constraint.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there is no active loan market. If 1 + BB 1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2 < pR < 1 +
BB
1−δ1Eδ2
δ1Eδ2
+ bF , then the expected profits to the firm, piF (p), the project size I(p), the
amount borrowed from the bank, L(p), and the amount borrowed from the market, M(p),
are
piF (p) =
pR− 1−BB(1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2 )
1− pR+ bF +BB(1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2 )
A
I(p) =
A
1− pR+ bF +BB(1−δ1Eδ2)δ1(Eδ2) )
M(p) = I(p)(1−BB)−A
L(p) = BBI(p).
The term BB(1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2 ) in the denominator of I(p) is the unit rent that accrues to the
bank. Together with the firm’s unit informational rent bF , this reduces the fraction of
the unit surplus pR − 1 that can be pledged to outside investors, thereby capping total
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investment size I.
Now, suppose that an active secondary market exists, and a bank can sell claims to
t = 2 cash flows at a price r at date 1. The firm then solves:
MaxI,L,M,RF ,RB {pRF I −A}
s.t.
pRF ≥ bF
δ1pRB ≥ BB + δ1rRB (7)
L ≤ δ1pRBI (8)
p(R−RF −RB)I ≥ M
I ≤ M +A+ L
I, L,M,RF , RB ≥ 0
The existence of a liquid market changes the bank’s incentive compatibility and partic-
ipation constraints (7) and (8) through changes in its discount factor. First, consider the
payoff to the bank who monitors the firm: δ1pRBI. The bank has been promised RBI if
the project succeeds. The bank can sell the claim at t = 1 if it finds out the project has
failed or if it receives a discount factor shock. Thus, with probability (1− p+ pq) the bank
sells its claim at price r = pq1−p+pq . With probability p(1 − q), it will not sell its claim but
values it at a discount rate of 1. Thus, the expected value of a dollar promised at t = 2 is
p which the bank discounts to t = 0 at δ1. If the bank shirks (the righthand side of (7)),
it receives private benefits of BBI. In addition, it knows that the project has failed. It can
therefore sell its promised payment of RBI at a price of r in the loan market. The t = 0
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value of this sale is δ1rRBI.
The change in expected discount rate affects a bank’s behavior through both the par-
ticipation and the incentive compatibility constraint. It is instructive to compare these new
constraints to those that obtain without a liquid loan market, namely constraints (2), and
(3). The bank’s participation constraint is easier to meet with this higher discount factor
because the cost of bank capital is lower: The price of the loan no longer features the liq-
uidity premium Eδ2. However, the impact of a liquid market on the incentive compatibility
constraint is ambiguous. First, the bank does not require a liquidity premium on date 2
cash flows. This reduces the cost of incentives. However a bank that does not monitor
and consumes private perquisites can now sell the worthless loan at the pooling price. This
makes shirking more attractive and thus the IC may be more difficult to satisfy. We demon-
strate in Section III that the optimal solution to this problem is to take out proportionally
larger loans from the bank. In sum, with an active secondary loan market, the firm needs
to borrow larger quantities from the bank, but each dollar is borrowed at a lower price.
Lemma 3 Suppose that there is a liquid loan market. If max
[
bF +BB
(
1
δ1
)
p
p−r ; 1 +BB
p
p−r
1−δ1
δ1
]
<
pR < 1+BB pp−r
1−δ1
δ1
+ bF , then the surplus to the firm, piF (p), the size of the project, I(p),
M(p), L(p) are
piF (p) =
pR− 1−BB( pp−r )
(
1−δ1
δ1
)
1− pR+ bF +BB( pp−r )
(
1−δ1
δ1
)A
I(p) = A
 1
1− pR+ bF +BB( pp−r )
(
1−δ1
δ1
)

L(p) = BB
(
p
p− r
)
I(p)
M(p) = I(p)
(
(1−BB)p− r
p− r
)
−A.
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BB( pp−r )
(
1−δ1
δ1
)
is the bank’s ex ante rent in presence of a liquid market.
Parameter Restrictions:
Lemmas 2 and 3 present solutions to the model under the respective parameter restric-
tions:
1 +BB
1− δ1Eδ2
δ1Eδ2
< pR < 1 +BB
1− δ1Eδ2
δ1Eδ2
+ bF ,
if there is no active market, and
max
[
bF +BB
(
1
δ1
)
p
p− r ; 1 +BB
p
p− r
1− δ1
δ1
]
< pR < 1 +BB
(
p
p− r
)
1− δ1
δ1
+ bF ,
if loan sales are possible. In both cases, the left-hand inequality ensures that the project
NPV is sufficiently high so that the firm can borrow from the bank and the market, and
that bank monitoring is feasible. The right-hand inequality bounds the NPV so that the
optimal investment size is finite. When we perform comparative statics we assume that these
conditions hold; effectively BB sufficiently small and bF sufficiently large. For a fixed R,
the conditions restrict default probabilities (1− p) to a small range. Empirically, Hamilton
(2001) finds that average five year cumulative default rates for investment grade names are
0.82% and 18.56% for speculative names. Thus, the interval of default probabilities that we
consider is small.
III. Liquidity and Efficiency
By assumption, the bank and bondholders are always held to their participation con-
straints. Thus, social surplus is maximized when the firm makes the highest profit. Given
the constant returns to scale technology, profits are maximal when the size of the project,
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I(p) is maximal. Equivalently, social efficiency demands that a firm borrows as much as
possible.
Recall,
I(p) = A

1
1−pR+bF+BB 1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2
if the loan is illiquid
1
1−pR+bF+BB pp−r
1−δ1
δ1
if the loan is liquid
Thus, a liquid secondary loan market is socially efficient if the bank’s unit rent is smaller
when there is active loan trading:
BB
p
p− r
1− δ1
δ1
< BB
1− δ1Eδ2
δ1Eδ2
.
To study the impact of loan liquidity on the bank’s rent, note that we derive I from equality
(5), the condition that bondholders make zero profits:
I(p)−A− L = pRI(p)− bF I(p)− pRBI(p).
Rearranging yields
I(p) =
A
1− pR+ bF + pRBI(p)−LI(p)
.
The bank’s rent, pRBI(p)−LI(p) , can be decomposed into
pRBI(p)− L
I(p)
= rB(p)fB(p)
where
rB(p) =
pRBI(p)− L
L
,
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is the time 0 expected rate of return on a bank loan, and
fB(p) =
L(p)
I(p)
is the fraction of the project funded by a bank loan.
A liquid loan market is efficient if and only if rB(p)fB(p), the expected cost of a bank
loan per unit investment, is smaller if the market is liquid. As indicated in the previous
section, this need not be the case. The existence of a liquid market has two countervailing
effects on rB(p) and fB(p). On one hand, with an active market, the bank no longer
demands a liquidity premium as it discounts t = 2 expected cash flows at δ1 not δ1Eδ2.
Thus, the firm can compensate the bank at t = 0 with a lower expected return. Formally,
Lemma 4 The expected rate of return on bank loans, rB(p) is lower if the secondary market
is liquid.
On the other hand, if there is a liquid secondary market, it is more difficult to make
monitoring incentive compatible. This is because a bank can sell non performing loans at
the pooling price. To mitigate this effect, the bank’s stake in the time 2 payoff if the market
is active has to be higher than if there is not. Bank capital is more expensive than bond
financing, and the former crowds out the latter, as the surplus pledgable to bondholders is
reduced by this increase in expensive capital. Thus, the proportion of public debt is lower.
Let fM (p) =
M(p)
I(p) denote the fraction of the project funded by cheap public debt.
Lemma 5 If the loan market is liquid for a name, then
(i) The ratio of bank debt over total project size, fB(p), is higher.
(ii) The ratio of public debt over total project size, fM (p), is lower.
While the cost of bank capital rB(p) is lower, proportionally more has to be solicited
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per unit investment to ensure that the bank monitors when the loan is liquid. If the net
effect is a reduction in the total surplus paid to the bank, rB(p)fB(p), then investment,
I(p), increases. Conversely, if there is an increase in the total surplus accruing to the bank,
then I(p) decreases.
Our main result is that this reduction in investment caused by loan sales may occur for
some parameter values. Thus, a liquid secondary market need not be efficient.
Proposition 1 (i) A liquid secondary loan market exists if and only if the possible discount
factor shock, δ, is sufficiently small so that δ ≤ pq1−p+pq .
(ii) A liquid secondary market is socially efficient if and only if the possible discount factor
shock, δ, is sufficiently small so that δ ≤ (1−q)(δ1−p)(1−p)−q(δ1−p) .
The first condition of Proposition 1 requires that for the market to be liquid, the pooling
price, r = pq1−p+pq , must be high enough so that banks who receive discount factor shocks
are willing to sell at this price.
Notice that for a fixed value of δ, an active market is ceteris paribus easier to sustain
for higher rated names. Alternatively, for a fixed default probability, liquidity arises when
the bank’s private cost of bearing risks until maturity is greater than the liquidity premium
in the loan market. Thus, we should expect to see more loans sold when banks are faced
with a higher opportunity cost of lending (lower δ). This observation is the basis for our
comparative statics results in Section 5. The second condition implies that for higher rated
names, a secondary market is more likely to be ex ante inefficient.
The condition for efficiency is the threshold below which aggregate investment is larger
when the loan is liquid. There are four possibilities in this economy.
<< Figure 3 about here >>
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Figure 3 illustrates that there can be too much or too little loan trading. Financial
institutions may inefficiently lay off low risk projects which leads to lower overall investment,
or may inefficiently retain more risky projects when their opportunity cost is low.
Proposition 2 If
(1− q)(δ1 − p)
(1− p)− q(δ1 − p) < δ ≤
pq
1− p+ pq ,
then the secondary loan market is liquid, but this is inefficient.
For such parameter values, any commitment device preventing banks from actively man-
aging their risks would be desirable ex ante. The intuition is the following. In our model,
loan sales are efficient if they reduce the total cost of loans. As we have shown, the ex-
pected return on bank loans always decreases with the advent of a liquid market, as banks
no longer demand a liquidity premium. This effect is independent of the credit rating of
the underlying name and only depends on the bank’s opportunity cost of capital (δ). By
contrast, as the credit quality of a firm increases, increasing amounts of bank loans have
to be solicited with the advent of a liquid market. Loans to firms with high credit quality
are very valuable in the secondary market and thus there is a proportionally larger benefit
to shirking. For large enough p, the quantity effect outweighs the price effect and a liquid
market is socially inefficient.13
IV. Cross-Sectional Implications
In our model, δ corresponds to the bank’s opportunity cost of bearing a loan. Thus,
a low δ corresponds to either profitable outside lending opportunities and tight financial
constraints, or both. In the United States, the Reigle-Neal Act removed barriers to interstate
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banking in 1994. The Basel Capital rules requiring banks to maintain capital reserves of
7.25% of loans were adopted in 1989. The reserve requirement was increased to 8% in
1992. In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporate Improvement Act (FDICIA) was
passed. Among other provisions, this law mandated “risk based” deposit insurance pricing.
Subsequent to the act’s passage, banks with lower capital ratios paid higher premia. Thus, in
contrast to the late 1980’s; the early to middle 1990’s were arguably a time when corporate
lending became more constrained by legislation while new banking opportunities emerged.
We interpret the late 1980’s as a period when δ was high and the early to middle 1990’s
as a period when δ was low.14 Consistent with this interpretation, in the late 1980’ s
banks shifted their investment portfolios away from corporate loans and into government
securities. Observers interpreted this as a response to the absence of capital requirements
for government securities in the Basel I rules. Several empirical studies (surveyed in Gorton
and Winton, 2002) find some empirical support for the hypothesis that this regulatory
arbitrage played a role in the “credit crunch” of the early 1990s.
We posit that the rise of loan liquidity was triggered by this change in δ, and consider
changes in market aggregates that must also have occurred over the same period. Formally,
consider a population of firms who differ only in credit ratings. Assume that their success
probabilities, p, are distributed on
[
p, p
]
according to G(·). We compare the cross-sectional
variations of firms’ financial structure for two different values of δ, denoted δ and δ, where
0 < δ < δ < 1.
Here, δ is the opportunity cost of lending in the mid 1990’s while δ is that of the late 1980’s.
As an active corporate loan market emerged in the 1990’s, we assume that the market is
illiquid for δ, while for δ there is a liquid loan market for all p ≥ p∗, where p∗ ∈
[
p, p
]
. This
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situation is depicted in Figure 4.
<< Figure 4 about here >>
Proposition 3 Suppose δ decreases from δ¯ to δ. Consider two firms that differ by their
success probabilities p′′ > p′, where p′′ ∈ [p∗, p¯], and p′ < p∗. Then, the yield spread between
bank loans to each firm is larger for δ than δ¯.
If δ = δ¯, the secondary market is illiquid, and the difference in yields between firms with
ratings p′ and p′′, denoted ∆, is
∆ = δ1(p
′′ − p′)(qδ¯ + 1− q).
If δ = δ liquidity arises for ratings above p∗, and the yield spread ∆ becomes
∆ = δ1(1− p′)(qδ + 1− q)− δ1
(
1− p′′
)
,
and thus
∆−∆ = −δ1p′q
(
δ¯ − δ)− δ1p′′q (1− δ¯) < 0
The first term on the right-hand side indicates that the yield has increased for the non
traded name p′ because of a decrease in δ. The second term corresponds to a smaller yield
for the traded name because the liquidity premium vanishes.
Empirically, this implies that the bank loan pricing schedule is more sensitive to borrower
credit quality in the late 1990s than the late 1980s. This observation can also be applied to
the credit default swap market, the emergence of which has closely mirrored the market for
loan sales. In the credit default swap market, banks buy insurance contracts against credit
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events. In our stylized model there is no difference between loan sales and credit default
swaps as both allow the banks to release regulatory capital.15 Thus, one interpretation of
Proposition 3 is that the slope of bank loan yields as a function of the rating p should have
steepened after the rise of credit derivatives, with no change in the distribution of credit
losses. Schuermann (2004) finds some evidence in support of this phenomenon. He finds
that an estimate of the slope for bank loan pricing schedules has steepened during the 90s,
while its equivalent for bond pricing schedules has flattened, if anything.
The proportion of bank financing in the economy should also have become more sensitive
to credit rating.
Proposition 4 Suppose δ decreases from δ¯ to δ. Then, the fraction of investments that
is financed with bank loans becomes more sensitive to the credit rating of firms. Or, for
p′ < p∗ < p′′,
fB(p′′, δ)− fB(p′, δ) < fB(p′′, δ)− fB(p′, δ).
In our model, for p > p∗, this fraction shifts from flat for δ, to increasing and convex for
δ.
Proposition 5 Suppose δ decreases from δ¯ to δ. Then, the fraction of investments that is
financed with bonds decreases for any rating. Or,
fM (p, δ) < fM (p, δ) ∀p ∈
[
p, p
]
.
Note that in our model, the difference between loans and bonds is that loans are held
by investors with monitoring skills (banks) while bonds are held by passive investors. In
practice, not only banks, but other sophisticated investors who arguably have monitoring
skills (institutional investors, hedge funds) have become increasingly active in the loan and
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private debt markets. Thus, empirical tests of Propositions 4 and 5 should compare the
fraction of loans and debt which is privately placed with a small number of sophisticated
investors with the fraction of publicly placed bonds.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Trading Credit Derivatives as an Incentive Device
It is instructive to compare our results to those established in Kahn and Winton (1998) and
Maug (1998). In a stock market context, they find that a long termist large investor may
have higher ex ante incentives to monitor a firm when the market for the firm shares has
a low informational efficiency. The intuition is that the large shareholder can buy shares
in the market that are undervalued at an interim date because they do not fully reflect the
impact of her high monitoring efforts on terminal cash flows. In our setting, this would
correspond to a situation in which the bank could be incentivized by the prospect of selling
credit insurance for the name that she has monitored at date 1. In our model, a bank which
sells protection in the credit derivatives market reveals that it owns a good loan, and cannot
profit from such a trade. This is because financially constrained banks would only buy
insurance protection in this model, and thus cannot be used to camouflage a sale of credit
protection.
Pooling
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), for tractability we abstract from the possibility that a
bank finances projects that are not perfectly positively correlated. If the bank could finance
diversifiable projects, we conjecture that the bank would find it optimal to sell senior claims
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backed by the whole pool of projects in the secondary market. A large financial-contracting
literature, pioneered by Diamond (1984), demonstrates the benefits from diversification
under asymmetric information.
Interestingly, however, the secondary loan market does not seem to apply this rule of
maximal diversification in practice. CLOs are often backed by fairly restricted pools, and
are commonly specialized by country and/or industry. This presents a puzzle: the market
for individual loans is rapidly growing which contradicts the principle of maximal pooling.
This suggests that diversification comes at a cost: potential investors may have different
degrees of expertise in different asset pools. In this case, selling undiversified claims may
increase the participation of sophisticated investors in the market for industries or names
for which they have expertise. Such a trade-off between focus and diversification is alluded
to by practitioners: Lucas et al. (2006) note that “Investors should certainly be wary of
deals in which very high diversity scores are achieved by managers straying from their fields
of expertise.”
Signalling
In Section 3, we noted in passing that a bank which owns a “good” loan but which is
financially distressed cannot credibly signal its type in the secondary market. This is because
the owner of a worthless loan with limited liability would always mimic any contract that
does not feature the possibility of negative future consumption in case of default on the
loan.
Alternatively, assume that the banks owns other long term assets that can be costlessly
pledged to the buyer of the loan in order to “overcollateralize” the deal, or equivalently to
credibly sell the loan with recourse. If the bank pledges a date 2 cash flow of at least 1δ for
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each unit of loan sold, then it is not mimicked by the owner of a bad loan.16 In practice,
overcollateralization is likely to be costly if the counterparties of the bank have a lower
valuation of the collateral than the bank itself. The cost of overcollateralization would then
determine whether a good bank prefers signalling its type to selling the loan at a pooling
price.
Perfect Learning:
The assumption that the bank perfectly learns the date 2 outcome at date 1 is simplifying,
but not innocuous. It implies that p measures both the ex ante riskiness of the project
and the ex post informational advantage of the bank. Alternatively, suppose that the bank
learns the date 2 outcome with probability k ∈ (0, 1). We suggest that our results are robust
under the assumption that higher rated firms are more transparent, or high p implies low
k. To see this, observe that there are now three types of banks trying to trade in the date-1
loan market:
(i) A bank who knows the loan is nonperforming;
(ii) A distressed bank who knows the loan is performing;
(iii) A distressed bank who does not have an informational advantage.
All such types would trade at the pooling price
r′ =
qp
q + k (1− p) (1− q) ,
if r′ > δ. Note that r′ is increasing in p and decreasing in k. Thus, under the assumption
that higher rated firms are more transparent, so that the informational gap between banks
and arm’s length lenders is smaller for such firms, then distinguishing between k and p
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a lower k should reinforce the impact of a higher p on the price of protection for higher
ratings. Similarly, inspection of the firm’s profit in Lemma 3 shows that it is increasing in
the loan spread, 1− r.
Basel II Capital Adequacy Rules:
In the cross-sectional analysis of Section 4, we studied the situation in which the same
capital requirement applies to all corporate loans. Specifically, the discount factor had a
constant value δ regardless of the credit rating p. This is in line with the Basel I rule
imposing the same capital weight of 8% for all corporate borrowers.
Under Basel II, capital weights are supposed to increase with respect to the riskiness of
loans. In our setting, the introduction of risk based capital requirements corresponds to a
situation in which the date 2 discount factor after a shock is no longer a constant, but is
rather an increasing function of p, δ(p). It is easy to see that such a prudential reform has
potentially positive effects in our setup, re-directing liquidity in the secondary market to
where it is most desirable.
First, for high rated names, for which liquidity is ex ante inefficient, a sufficient reduction
in capital requirements—namely, a sufficiently large increase in δ—will cause a desirable
decrease in liquidity in the secondary market. Conversely, for lower rated names that do not
trade in the secondary market under Basel I, even though this would be ex ante desirable,
a reduction in δ may spur financial innovation. In this case, a liquid market is desirable
because the cost of additional incentives is lower than the benefits from flexibility.
We note that in our model, capital requirements are exogenous costs imposed on banks,
and therefore on firms. It seems thus intuitive that, in the case of high rated names, a
reduction in these costs would be overall welfare improving. Perhaps more interesting is the
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result that, for high risk issuers, an increase in this exogenous cost imposed on the economy
may actually be welfare improving, because this constraint spurs efficient liquidity. The
intuition is that for sufficiently low rated names, the negative impact of liquidity on ex ante
incentives is limited because the market value of the risk, based on the prior probability of
default, is low.
In sum, we have analyzed the recent rise of a secondary loan market with a simple model
of endogenous liquidity. Banks trade actively when they find that selling a loan is preferable
to bearing its risk. Their risks become liquid when the benefits from relaxing financial
constraints overcome the informational cost of shedding risks. We posit that because banks’
opportunity cost of carrying loans has increased, markets have evolved which allow banks
to separate balance sheet management and borrower relationship management. Because
liquidity implies ex ante inefficiencies, we predict possible excessive trading in high rated
paper, and insufficient liquidity in higher yield tranches. Risk-based capital requirements
for financial institutions should redeploy liquidity where it is the most desirable; namely
where the gains in financial flexibility overcome the costs associated with banks’ reduced
incentives to develop a long term relationship with their borrowers.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Recall, ∆(p) = (1−p)p(1−q)1−p(1−q) . Thus,
d∆(p)
dp
=
(
1− 2 p+ p2 (1− q)) (1− q)
(1 + p (−1 + q))2
Here, ∆(p)1−p =
p(1−q)
1−p+pq . Clearly
d
(
∆(p)
1−p
)
dp
=
(
p (1− q) (1− q)
(1− p+ p q)2
)
+
1− q
1− p+ p q ≥ 0
d2
(
∆(p)
1−p
)
(dp)2
=
2 p (1− q) (1− q)2
(1− p+ p q)3 +
2 (1− q) (1− q)
(1− p+ p q)2 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2, 3
For each of these cases, all the constraints are binding. The stated results follow.
Proof of Lemma 4
The promised return per dollar invested is pRBIL . Thus, if there is a liquid secondary
market, this is pRBIL =
1
δ1
. If not then pRBIL =
1
Eδ2δ1
.
The result follows from Eδ2 < 1.
Proof of Lemma 5
(i) The ratio of bank debt over total project size if there is an active loan market is
LLiq
ILiq
=
pBB
p− r ,
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and if there is not,
Lno
Ino
= BB.
Thus, L
Liq
ILiq
≥ LnoIno if p ≥ p− r, which always holds.
(ii) The ratio of market debt over total project size, if there is no active market is
Mno
Ino
= pR− bF −BB 1
δ1Eδ2
,
and if there is one,
MLiq
ILiq
= pR− bF −BB p
δ1(p− r) .
Mno
Ino ≥ M
Liq
ILiq
if Eδ2 > p−rp , which always holds.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) A bank will sell the loan on a failed project at any price r ≥ 0. A bank with a
successful project values it at δ2R, thus will sell it if rR ≥ δ2R, or r ≥ δ2. If r < δ, then
only the banks who know that the project is unsuccessful will sell, thus claims are worth
0. If r ≥ δ2, then with probability 1− p, the bank knows the project is a failure, and with
probability pq, the project was a success, but the bank got a shock. Thus, if r ≥ δ2, the
expected value of $ 1 promised at date 2 is pq+(1−p)0pq+(1−p) .
(ii) Follows immediately from
I = A

1
1−pR+bF+BB 1−δ1Eδ2δ1Eδ2
if the market is liquid
1
1−pR+bF+BB pp−r
1−δ1
δ1
if not.
Proof of Proposition 2
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Straightforward consequence of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
If δ = δ¯, there is no market, then the difference in yields between a firm with p′ and p′′
denoted ∆ is
∆ = δ1(p
′′ − p′)(qδ¯ + 1− q).
If δ = δ a liquid market arises for ratings above p∗, and the yield spread ∆ is
∆ = δ1(1− p′)(qδ + 1− q)− δ1
(
1− p′′
)
,
and thus
∆−∆ = −δ1p′q
(
δ¯ − δ)− δ1p′′q (1− δ¯) < 0
Proof of Proposition 4
From Proof of Lemma 5, the ratio of bank debt over total project size if there is an
active market is
LLiq
ILiq
=
pBB
p− r ,
and if there is not,
Lno
Ino
= BB.
Proof of Proposition 5
From Proof of Lemma 5, the ratio of market debt over total project size, if there is no
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secondary loan market is
Mno
Ino
= pR− bF −BB 1
δ1Eδ2
,
and if there is one,
MLiq
ILiq
= pR− bF −BB p
δ1(p− r) .
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Notes
1This is reported in Lucas et al. (2006).
2This figure is reported in Drucker and Puri (2006).
3 This assumption follows Breton (2003).
4See The Economist Jan 16, 2003.
5Specifically, we assume that all contractible payments are bounded below by a finite
amount that we normalize to 0.
6DeMarzo (2005) represents a recent contribution.
7Alternatively, one could model the bank as incurring a private monitoring cost. The
current formulation is the simplest one that ensures all constraints bind at the optimum.
8We assume that the realization of bank’s discount factor at t = 1 takes on two possible
values for simplicity. The qualitative results go through if the bank’s outside opportunities
are drawn from a known continuous distribution.
9That the bank has all the bargaining power at time 1 simplifies the derivation of the
optimal contracts, but is not crucial to our results. The key driver of the results is that the
bank acquires proprietary information through monitoring.
10A typical solvency ratio requires that 8% of the weighted sum of assets be less than the
book value of equity.
11We explore this idea further in Section 5.
12We note in passing that a trivial zero trade equilibrium can also be constructed by
assigning the arbitrary off-equilibrium path belief to the bond market that banks with a
discount factor shock do not trade. In such an equilibrium the price is also zero.
13We conjecture that in a dynamic model with reputation effects, higher rated firms may
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require less monitoring.
14We focus on a decrease in δ to simplify the analysis. An increase in q yields similar
results.
15Under such an interpretation the secondary market loan spread in our model corre-
sponds to the price of protection in the CDS market.
16The (distressed) owner of a bad loan would receive $1 from the loan sale, and lose the
collateral at date 2 which has a present cost of 1 at date 1.
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.Bank chooses monitor or not
Firm shirks or not
Contracts written
and
Firm Invests
t = 0
Bank learns:
(i) δ˜2 ∈ {δ, 1}
(ii) if project succeeds
Bank offers
new contracts
t = 1
Claims
Pay off
t = 2
Figure 1. Sequence of Events
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Figure 2. The loan spread and default probabilities
The figure illustrates the loan spread and the default probability as a function of p, the
probability that the project succeeds. The loan spread is always greater than the default
probability.
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δp probability of success
illiquid
efficient
liquid
efficient
liquid
inefficient
illiquid
inefficient
Figure 3. Efficiency and Liquidity
Four different combinations of efficiency and liquidity may exist in an economy. If p, the
probability of success is sufficiently high then the loan markets are liquid; if the bank’s
opportunity cost of capital is sufficiently high (δ sufficiently low) then financial innovation
is efficient.
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Figure 4. Change in Bank Cost of Capital from δ¯ in the late 1980’s to δ in the
early 1990’s
In the early 1980’s banks’ opportunity cost of capital was low (δ was high). After regulatory
changes, the opportunity cost of capital increased (δ fell) and financial innovation allowed
banks to trade credit risk (Credit Risk Transfer market was liquid) on highly rated names
(i.e., for p > p∗).
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